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Abstract - To what extent should taxpayers deduct expenses in-
curred domestically that contribute to foreign income production? 
It is widely believed that if the home country does not tax foreign 
income, then it also should not permit deductions for that portion 
of domestic expenses attributable to earning foreign income. This 
prescription is, however, inconsistent with the decision to exempt 
foreign income from taxation in the fi rst place. The paper shows that, 
for any system of taxing foreign income, the consistent and effi cient 
treatment is to permit domestic expense deductions for all expenses 
incurred domestically. This differs from the current U.S. regime, 
under which American fi rms were required to allocate more than 
$110 billion of domestic expenses against foreign income in 2004.
INTRODUCTION
Income tax systems, such as that used by the United States, permit taxpayers to claim deductions for expenses incurred 
in the course of earning income. Thus, a taxpayer who spends 
$100 on labor and materials to produce output subsequently 
sold for $140 will be taxed on income of only $40, since the 
$100 expense is deductible for tax purposes. Any sensible 
income tax must permit expense deductions, since otherwise 
it becomes a form of turnover tax, taxing gross rather than 
net income, overstating the incomes of some taxpayers, and 
reducing the effi ciency of the economy by prompting exces-
sive vertical integration and discouraging other activities that 
add economic value.
In an open economy, a taxpayer may incur expenses in 
one jurisdiction that contribute to producing income in other 
jurisdictions. What is the appropriate tax treatment of such 
expenses?
It is natural to match expense deductions against revenue 
attributable to the expenses. As a practical matter, however, 
considerable challenges arise in matching deductions against 
income for certain types of expenses, such as interest expense 
or general and administrative expense, that are general to a 
fi rm and diffi cult to attribute to particular activities. If a large 
multinational fi rm headquartered in the United States and 
with operations in 20 other countries spends $80 million on 
headquarters activities in the United States, the foreign coun-
tries typically do not permit the fi rm to take local tax deduc-
tions for any portion of the $80 million headquarters expense. 
What then should be the policy of the home country—should 
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the fi rm be permitted to deduct the $80 
million against its U.S. income or should 
that deduction be limited by apportioning 
some fraction of the $80 million against its 
income in other countries?
The common answer to this question is 
that it depends on the nature of the home 
country tax regime. So this reasoning goes, 
the firm should be permitted to claim 
home country deductions only for that 
part of an expense that produces income 
taxed by the home country. Hence, if a fi rm 
is resident in a country that taxes domestic 
but not foreign income, it follows that the 
portion of domestic expenses incurred to 
produce foreign income should not be 
deductible in the home country.
The analysis in this paper takes issue 
with this answer, instead concluding that 
the only policy consistent with effi ciency, 
given the refusal of foreign governments 
to allow taxpayers to take deductions 
for general expenses incurred outside 
their countries, is to permit full domestic 
deductibility of expenses incurred in the 
home country. Full domestic deductibility 
is a feature of any effi cient tax regime, 
including residence based worldwide 
tax systems with and without provision 
of foreign tax credits, and a system in 
which the home country exempts active 
foreign business income from taxation. 
All that is necessary is that the home 
country tax regime be tailored to promote 
home country welfare effi ciently, and if it 
is, then full domestic deductibility is an 
effi cient policy.
The claim that full domestic deduct-
ibility of home country expenses promotes 
effi ciency is perhaps unintuitive and is 
certainly inconsistent with current U.S. 
policy and most prior analysis of this 
subject. In order to appreciate why full 
domestic deductibility is effi cient, it is 
necessary to understand why countries 
have the international tax systems they do. 
This is particularly important in the cases 
of countries that exempt foreign income 
from taxation. Such tax systems appear 
ineffi cient from the standpoint of single 
investment decisions in isolation, since 
from this perspective they seem to give 
excessive incentives to invest in low–tax 
foreign countries. Hence, if an exemp-
tion system is effi cient, it must be that 
its effi ciency stems from considerations 
omitted by considering just one invest-
ment at a time. Since new investments 
trigger reactions by investors and their 
competitors, it is important to incorporate 
these reactions in evaluating the welfare 
properties of exempting foreign income 
from home country taxation. It is from the 
standpoint of all of the induced reactions 
that permitting full domestic expense 
deductibility makes considerable sense, 
since the failure to permit deductibility 
would distort asset ownership patterns 
and thereby reduce the productivity of 
domestic business operations.
It should not be surprising that a fully 
efficient tax system permits complete 
deductibility of domestic expenses. It 
is an effi cient, and virtually universal, 
practice to permit full deductibility of 
domestic expenses incurred by fi rms that 
earn only domestic income, since effi cient 
taxation preserves incentives to spend $1 
to create more than $1 of pretax economic 
return. But a tax system that maximizes 
the welfare of the residence country also 
taxes foreign income in a way that makes 
the residence country indifferent between 
a marginal dollar of activity undertaken 
by one of its fi rms at home or abroad. If 
this were not so—if, for example, the home 
government would prefer that its fi rms 
concentrate more of their activity at home 
at the expense of activities abroad—then 
the tax treatment of foreign income must 
not be optimal in the fi rst place. Hence, 
with optimal tax systems the value of 
foreign activity at the margin is the same 
as the value of domestic activity, so if 
an expense is properly deductible when 
producing domestic income, effi ciency 
requires that it also be deductible when 
producing foreign income.
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The second section of the paper 
describes international practice in per-
mitting expense deductions and reviews 
evidence of the impact of the U.S. system 
of allocating domestic expenses against 
foreign income. The third section of the 
paper summarizes the effi ciency ratio-
nales underlying competing systems of 
taxing foreign income. The fourth section 
analyzes the deductibility of domestic 
expenses with worldwide and territorial 
(exemption) tax systems, fi nding in every 
case that the efficient treatment corre-
sponds to full domestic deductibility. The 
fi fth section is the conclusion.
DOMESTIC EXPENSE DEDUCTIONS 
IN PRACTICE
The tax treatment of domestic expenses 
incurred by multinational businesses 
varies between countries and over time 
within the same country. Most of the world 
exempts active foreign business income 
from taxation and also effectively permits 
taxpayers full domestic tax deductions 
for general domestic business expenses, 
such as interest expense and general and 
administrative expenses. The details of 
these policies differ among countries; 
some permit blanket domestic expense 
deductibility, whereas others use tracing 
rules that require taxpayers to identify the 
income streams that deductible expenses 
are incurred to produce.1 As a practical 
matter, tracing rules are largely equivalent 
to blanket domestic deductibility (Shaviro, 
2001), since the unwillingness of foreign 
governments to grant tax deductions for 
domestic expenses gives taxpayers incen-
tives to arrange their tracing to maximize 
domestic deductions. Most countries 
limit the deductibility of domestic inter-
est expenses with “thin capitalization” 
rules of one form or another (Buettner, 
Overesch, Schreiber, and Wamser 2008), 
and while these typically apply even 
to purely domestic fi rms, there may be 
additional restrictions on interest deduc-
tions taken by foreign–owned fi rms and 
fi rms whose foreign affi liates have capital 
structures that differ greatly from those of 
their parent companies. In addition, there 
are countries that exempt slightly less 
than 100 percent of active foreign business 
income (France exempts only 95 percent, 
for example) to compensate, in some very 
rough sense, for permitting full domestic 
deductibility of home country expenses.
U.S. Expense Allocation Rules and Their 
Impact
The United States currently allows 
full deductibility of domestic expenses, 
but also requires taxpayers to allocate 
domestic expenses against foreign income 
for purposes of calculating foreign tax 
credits, thereby effectively limiting the 
deductibility of these expenses in some 
cases. Different rules apply to research 
and development (R&D) expenses, inter-
est expenses, and other expenses that are 
supportive in nature, including overhead, 
general and administrative expenses, 
supervisory expenses, advertising, mar-
keting, and other sales expenses. In the 
case of supportive expenses, such as gen-
eral and administrative expenses, fi rms 
are entitled to deduct expenses incurred 
in the United States, but must allocate a 
portion of these expenses against foreign 
income based on the fraction of total 
income from foreign sources or activity 
undertaken in foreign countries. The 
signifi cance of allocating these expenses 
against foreign income is that doing 
so reduces the foreign tax credit limit, 
thereby reducing the taxpayer’s ability 
to offset its U.S. tax liability on foreign 
income with credits for foreign income tax 
payments. This is consequential only for 
1 U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Taxation (2008) describes the practices of other countries, and Slaats (2007) 
offers a review of recent international developments in the deductibility of interest and other expenses.
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taxpayers with excess foreign tax credits, 
since for those without excess foreign tax 
credits the limit does not bind. American 
taxpayers have excess foreign tax credits if 
their average foreign tax rates exceed the 
U.S. rate, and in the absence of expense 
allocation these taxpayers would owe 
no U.S. tax on their foreign incomes. For 
these taxpayers, reducing by one dollar 
the net foreign income used to calculate 
the foreign tax credit limit increases their 
U.S. tax liability by an amount equal to the 
marginal U.S. tax rate. This exactly offsets 
the value of the original deduction, so the 
U.S. system effectively denies domestic 
expense deductions for the allocated 
portion of general and administrative 
expenses incurred by taxpayers with for-
eign income taxed so heavily by foreign 
governments that it winds up untaxed 
by the United States. Taxpayers whose 
foreign income is lightly taxed by foreign 
governments, and who, therefore, owe 
residual U.S. tax on that income, receive 
the benefi t of full domestic deductibility of 
expenses incurred in the United States.
Different, and rather more strict, rules 
apply to the allocation of interest expenses 
and R&D expenses, though with similar 
effect. Interest expenses are allocated 
against foreign source income based on 
relative values of domestic and foreign 
assets as calculated using a method that 
is widely criticized (e.g., Shaviro (2001) on 
several grounds, including that it ignores 
foreign borrowing; this system is currently 
scheduled to change in 2009. Half of a 
multinational fi rm’s U.S. R&D expense 
is allocated against U.S. income, with 
the remaining half apportioned between 
domestic and foreign source based on 
relative sales or income. For all of these 
expenses the allocation rules matter only 
if taxpayers have excess foreign tax cred-
its, in which case they are tantamount to 
denying domestic deductions for that por-
tion of expenses allocated against foreign 
income. Different rules prevailed prior to 
passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 
and the evidence indicates that Ameri-
can fi rms with excess foreign tax credits 
responded to the tax reform by changing 
their domestic borrowing patterns and 
domestic R&D spending around the end 
of 1986 in reaction to the higher after–tax 
cost of domestic borrowing and domestic 
R&D activity.2
These rules signifi cantly infl uence the 
tax positions of American fi rms. Table 1 
presents data on the aggregate volume of 
corporate expense deductions allocated 
against foreign income between 1992 and 
2004. In 2004, American corporations allo-
cated $110.8 billion of domestic expenses 
against foreign income, of which interest 
expenses accounted for $42.0 billion and 
R&D expenses accounted for $13.5 bil-
lion. Total allocated domestic expense 
represents more than 45 percent of the 
$241.5 billion taxable foreign income of 
American fi rms in that year, and was even 
higher fractions of taxable foreign income 
in other years.3
Table 2 provides an industry breakdown 
of these allocated domestic expenses 
in 2004. Manufacturing corporations 
allocated $46.1 billion of total domestic 
expenses against foreign income of $154.6 
2 Collins and Shackelford (1992), Froot and Hines (1995) and Altshuler and Mintz (1995) analyze responses 
to the interest allocation rules introduced in 1986, and Hines (1993) analyzes the response of R&D activity 
to changes in the R&D expense allocation rules. These studies provide greater detail on the reforms and the 
incentives they created.
3 Expense allocation matters only if a fi rm has excess foreign tax credits, which not all American fi rms do, so 
it would be inaccurate to conclude that allocating $110 billion of expenses to foreign income at a tax rate of 
35 percent increases the U.S. tax liabilities of American fi rms by $38.5 billion. But since a taxpayer’s foreign 
tax credit status is itself the product of many purposeful choices that are infl uenced by the expense allocation 
rules, it is not correct either to take the foreign tax credit status as given in evaluating the cost of expense al-
location.
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billion. Service industry corporations and 
those in the fi nance, insurance and real 
estate industries allocated a total of $49.9 
billion of domestic expenses against total 
foreign income of just $53.5 billion, the 
allocated expenses representing a much 
larger fraction of foreign income than 
in manufacturing. Manufacturing fi rms 
accounted for $10.9 billion of the $13.5 
billion total allocated R&D expense, but 
signifi cantly smaller fractions of other 
expenses.
TABLE 1
DOMESTIC CORPORATE EXPENSES ALLOCATED AGAINST FOREIGN INCOME, 1992–2004
Source: Statistics of Income Division, U.S. Internal Revenue Service.
Note: Entries are drawn from information reported by corporations claiming the foreign tax credit. Figures in 
the table are thousands of current dollars.
Number of 
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INDUSTRY DETAIL OF FOREIGN EXPENSE ALLOCATION, 2004
Number of 
returnsIndustries Total












Source: Statistics of Income Division, U.S. Internal Revenue Service.
Note: Entries are drawn from information reported by corporations claiming the foreign tax credit in 2004. Figures in the 
table are thousands of 2004 dollars. Entries in cells marked by an asterisk (*) are based on such small numbers of signifi cant 
reporting fi rms that the fi gures may be unreliable.
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The U.S. expense allocation rules infl u-
ence the demand for R&D, administrative, 
and other activities in the United States, 
since firms with highly taxed foreign 
income do not benefit from full tax 
deductibility even in cases in which they 
incur expenses in order to earn income in 
the United States. The reason is that the 
allocation method does not attempt to 
identify the location of income generated 
by each expense, but instead implicitly 
attributes location on the basis of total 
foreign and domestic income and activity. 
More importantly, the expense allocation 
rules discourage foreign activity and 
foreign income production by fi rms with 
excess foreign tax credits, since the scope 
of its foreign operations affects the ability 
of a fi rm to benefi t from tax deductions 
for a given amount of domestic expense. 
This limit on the effective deductibility 
of domestic expenses acts as a type of tax 
on marginal foreign activity, one whose 
rate depends on the fi rm’s excess foreign 
tax credit status and the magnitude of 
its allocable domestic expenses. This tax 
encourages fi rms to substitute domestic 
for foreign activity, with greater substitu-
tion incentives for fi rms with signifi cant 
domestic expenses.
Reform Proposals
Numerous recent reform proposals 
would change U.S. taxation of foreign 
income by exempting active foreign busi-
ness income from U.S. taxation. As pro-
posed, schemes such as those analyzed by 
Graetz and Oosterhuis (2001), Grubert and 
Mutti (2001), and Altshuler and Grubert 
(2008) would exempt from U.S. taxation 
dividends received from foreign subsid-
iaries. At the same time, these reforms 
would limit the ability of American fi rms 
to deduct domestic expenses for interest 
and supportive activities such as gen-
eral and administrative activities. These 
expenses would be allocated between 
domestic and foreign income based on 
measures of domestic and foreign assets 
or incomes, with the portion allocated to 
foreign income effectively nondeductible 
for domestic (or foreign) tax purposes. 
The same treatment of domestic expenses 
appears in the territorial tax reform pro-
posals considered by the U.S. Congress, 
Joint Committee on Taxation (2005), the 
President’s Advisory Panel on Federal 
Income Tax Reform (2005), and the U.S. 
Treasury (2007). Hence, from a U.S. tax 
reform proposal standpoint, exempting 
foreign income from taxation appears to 
be closely associated with limiting the 
deductibility of domestic expenses.
This is a curious association, since 
exempting foreign income from home 
country taxation while limiting the 
deductibility of domestic expenses based 
on levels of foreign and domestic activity 
essentially replaces one tax on foreign 
operations with another. An expense 
allocation method that permits taxpayers 
to claim domestic tax deductions for only 
a fraction of domestic expenses, with the 
fraction equal to the ratio of domestic to 
total income, penalizes earning foreign 
income and rewards earning domestic 
income. The implied tax rate on foreign 
income is the product of the statutory 
tax rate, the ratio of domestic expenses 
to worldwide income, and the ratio of 
domestic to worldwide income. The 
implied rate of subsidy for producing 
domestic income is the product of the 
statutory tax rate, the ratio of domestic 
expenses to worldwide income, and the 
ratio of foreign to worldwide income.4 
Replacing a tax on foreign income with 
4 This is apparent by writing the fi rm’s cost of domestic expense allocation as Rt(F/F + D), in which R is the 
level of allocable domestic expense, t is the domestic tax rate, F is foreign income, and D is domestic income. 
Differentiating this expression with respect to F produces: [R/(F + D)]t[D/(F + D)]. Similarly, differentiating 
the expression with respect to D yields: –[R/(F + D)]t[F/(F + D)].
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an exemption system that limits the 
deductibility of domestic expenses does 
not remove the tax burden on foreign busi-
ness activity, but instead merely changes 
the form of the tax burden and makes it 
less transparent.
There is an understandable appeal to 
limiting the deductibility of domestic 
expenses when the foreign portion of a 
fi rm’s income is exempt from domestic 
taxation, and indeed, tax systems com-
monly restrict expense deductibility if 
the underlying income is untaxed. A 
prominent example, frequently cited by 
international tax reform proposals, is the 
restriction preventing American taxpayers 
from deducting interest payments if the 
borrowed capital is devoted to tax–exempt 
investments such as state and local bonds. 
This restriction on interest deductibility is 
intended to prevent arbitrage, though it is 
widely believed that, in the case of state 
and local bonds, its net effect is actually to 
create arbitrage opportunities by restrict-
ing demand for tax–preferred assets to a 
limited clientele of high tax rate potential 
buyers. Critics (e.g., Shakow (1987)) have 
called for repealing the restriction on inter-
est deductibility to eliminate this prob-
lem, which might serve as a cautionary 
tale for those who would limit domestic 
expense deductibility in a territorial tax 
system.
THE TAXATION OF FOREIGN 
INCOME5
The older wisdom in the international 
tax policy area is that worldwide taxation 
of business income with provision of for-
eign tax credits promotes world welfare, 
whereas worldwide taxation of busi-
ness income without foreign tax credits 
(instead permitting taxpayers to deduct 
foreign tax payments in calculating tax-
able income) promotes domestic wel-
fare. These claims about the underlying 
welfare economics, introduced by Peggy 
Musgrave (Richman, 1963; Musgrave, 
1969) and subsequently quite infl uential, 
have come under considerable academic 
fire in recent years. Modern economic 
thinking parts company with Musgrave’s 
analysis in incorporating the effects of 
world capital markets and, in particular, 
the impact of ownership on capital asset 
productivity.
Capital Export Neutrality and National 
Neutrality
The Musgrave notion of capital export 
neutrality is the doctrine that the return to 
capital should be taxed at the same total 
rate regardless of the location in which it is 
earned. If a home country tax system satis-
fi es capital export neutrality, then invest-
ments that maximize after–tax returns also 
maximize pre–tax returns, and there are 
then circumstances in which decentralized 
profi t–maximizing behavior is consistent 
with global economic effi ciency. The capi-
tal export neutrality concept is frequently 
invoked as a normative justifi cation for 
the design of tax systems similar to that 
used by the United States, since accrual 
taxation of worldwide income with pro-
vision of unlimited foreign tax credits 
satisfies capital export neutrality. This 
does not describe the U.S. tax system, 
however, since taxpayers are permitted 
to defer home country taxation of certain 
unrepatriated foreign income, and foreign 
tax credits are limited, but the capital 
export neutrality notion is nevertheless 
the basis of the argument that systems of 
taxing foreign income similar to that used 
by the United States enhance world wel-
fare. The argument can then be extended 
to say that, due to international coopera-
tive bargaining, countries that adopt tax 
policies advancing world welfare thereby 
5 This section draws on material in Desai and Hines (2003, 2004) and Hines (forthcoming).
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may ultimately advance even their own 
welfares (Shaviro, 2007).
The Musgrave analysis implies that 
governments that seek to maximize 
national but not necessarily world welfare 
should tax the foreign incomes of their 
resident companies while permitting 
only deductions for foreign taxes paid. 
Such taxation satisfi es what is known as 
national neutrality, discouraging foreign 
investment by imposing a form of double 
taxation, but doing so in the interest of the 
home country that disregards the value of 
tax revenue collected by foreign govern-
ments. From the standpoint of the home 
country, foreign taxes are simply costs 
of doing business abroad and, therefore, 
warrant the same treatment as other 
costs, for which it is appropriate to give 
deductions and not credits against home 
country taxes. In this analysis, the home 
country’s desired allocation of capital is 
one in which its fi rms equate marginal 
after–tax foreign returns with marginal 
pretax domestic returns, a condition that 
is satisfied by full taxation of foreign 
income after deduction of foreign taxes. 
This line of thinking suggests that the 
American policy of taxing foreign income 
while granting foreign tax credits is far 
too generous from the standpoint of the 
United States. In this view there is a ten-
sion between tax policies that advance 
national welfare by taxing after–tax 
foreign income, and those that advance 
global welfare by taxing foreign income 
while permitting taxpayers to claim for-
eign tax credits. The practice of most of 
the world in effectively exempting most 
foreign income from taxation, is, by this 
reasoning, diffi cult to understand, since 
it is inconsistent with either national or 
global interests.
Ownership Neutrality
Investment by domestic fi rms at home 
and abroad is likely to infl uence invest-
ment by foreign fi rms, which is incon-
sistent with the logic underlying capital 
export neutrality and national neutrality. 
If greater investment abroad by home–
country firms triggers greater invest-
ment by domestic or foreign fi rms in the 
home country, and there is considerable 
evidence that it does,6 then it no longer 
follows that the home country maximizes 
its welfare by taxing foreign income while 
permitting only a deduction for foreign 
taxes paid. The reason is that, from the 
standpoint of the home country, greater 
foreign investment by domestic fi rms does 
not come at the cost of reduced domestic 
investment, so there is no longer a welfare 
loss associated with reducing investment 
that is already excessively discouraged 
by domestic taxes. From the standpoint 
of global welfare, if home and foreign 
fi rms compete for the ownership of capital 
around the world, and the productivity 
of an investment depends on its owner-
ship, then it is no longer the case that the 
taxation of foreign income together with 
the provision of foreign tax credits neces-
sarily contributes to global productive 
effi ciency.
The importance of ownership to pro-
ductivity is refl ected in the modern theory 
of foreign direct investment, which is 
based on a transaction–cost approach 
whereby the market advantages of mul-
tinational fi rms stem from the benefi ts 
conferred by joint ownership of assets 
across locations. It is also consistent with 
the scale of operation of the large and 
extremely active worldwide market in 
mergers, acquisitions, and asset divesti-
6 This includes aggregate time–series evidence of the behavior of U.S. multinational fi rms (Desai, Foley and 
Hines, 2005), aggregate evidence for Australia (Faeth, 2006), industry–level studies of Germany (Arndt, Buch, 
and Schnitzer, 2007) and Canada (Hejazi and Pauly, 2003), and fi rm–level evidence for the United States (Desai, 
Foley and Hines, forthcoming), the United Kingdom (Simpson, 2008) and Germany (Kleinert and Toubal, 
2007).
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tures, with participating fi rms willing to 
bear the costs of the associated ownership 
realignments in return for the advantages 
that are associated with them. The modern 
property rights approach to the theory of 
the fi rm, as developed in Grossman and 
Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), 
suggests that the prevalence of incomplete 
contracts justifi es particular confi gura-
tions of ownership arrangements. It is the 
ability to exercise power through residual 
rights when contracts cannot prespecify 
outcomes that makes ownership impor-
tant, and such settings are particularly 
likely to characterize multinational fi rms 
investing abroad. Desai, Foley and Hines 
(2004) analyze the changing ownership 
decisions of multinational firms, find-
ing that globalization has made firms 
reluctant to share ownership of foreign 
affi liates, given the higher returns to coor-
dinated transactions inside fi rms.
Tax systems satisfy capital ownership 
neutrality if they do not distort owner-
ship patterns (Desai and Hines, 2003, 
2004). Capital ownership neutrality is 
important to effi ciency only insofar as 
ownership is important to effi ciency, a 
notion that is ruled out by assumption in 
the Musgrave framework that serves as 
the basis of capital export neutrality and 
national neutrality. If the productivity of 
a business asset depends on who owns it 
together with other assets, then tax sys-
tems promote effi ciency if they encourage 
the most productive ownership of assets 
within the set of feasible investors.
Capital ownership neutrality is satisfi ed 
if all countries exempt foreign income 
from taxation, since taxation would then 
not favor one set of potential investors at 
the expense of another, but the exemption 
of foreign income from taxation is not 
necessary for capital ownership neutrality 
to be satisfi ed. If all countries tax foreign 
income (possibly at different rates), while 
permitting taxpayers to claim foreign 
tax credits, then ownership would be 
determined by productivity differences 
and not tax differences, thereby meeting 
the requirements for capital ownership 
neutrality. In this case the total tax bur-
den on foreign and domestic investment 
varies between taxpayers with different 
home countries, but every investor has an 
incentive to allocate investments in a way 
that maximizes pretax returns.
The same circumstances that make 
capital ownership neutrality desirable 
from the standpoint of world welfare also 
imply that countries disregarding world 
welfare have incentives to exempt foreign 
income from taxation no matter what 
other countries do. The reason is that, 
from an ownership standpoint, additional 
outbound foreign investment does not 
reduce domestic tax revenue, since any net 
reduction in home–country investment by 
domestic fi rms is offset by greater invest-
ment by foreign fi rms. With unchanging 
domestic tax revenue, home–country 
welfare increases in the after–tax profi t-
ability of domestic companies, which is 
maximized if foreign profi ts are exempt 
from taxation. Tax systems that exempt 
foreign income from taxation are, there-
fore, said to satisfy national ownership 
neutrality. Hence, it is possible to under-
stand why so many countries exempt for-
eign income from taxation, and it follows 
that, if every country did so, tax systems 
would conform, capital ownership would 
be allocated effi ciently, and global output 
would thereby be maximized.
Implications for Domestic Expense 
Deductions
Competing effi ciency concepts carry 
differing implications for effi cient taxation 
of foreign income, which in turn infl uence 
the desirability of permitting taxpayers to 
take deductions for domestic expenses. If 
international investors do not compete for 
potential ownership of the same assets, 
and greater foreign investment comes at 
the cost of reduced domestic investment, 
then governments promote national 
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welfare by taxing foreign income on 
accrual while providing only deductions 
for foreign income tax payments. Under 
the same circumstances, governments 
promote global welfare by permitting tax-
payers to claim tax credits for foreign tax 
payments, a policy that may also advance 
national welfare if nations cooperate to 
share the benefi ts of international eco-
nomic policies. In both of these cases, full 
deductibility of domestic expenses is con-
sistent with effi ciency. Governments that 
tax foreign income while permitting only 
a deduction for foreign income tax pay-
ments subject after–foreign–tax returns 
to home country taxation, and expenses 
incurred to produce these returns are 
properly deductible. Governments that 
tax worldwide income while provid-
ing foreign tax credits do so to promote 
global efficiency; since domestic plus 
foreign returns are cumulatively taxed at 
the domestic tax rate, effi ciency requires 
that the expenses incurred to produce 
these returns should be deductible at the 
domestic tax rate.
If greater foreign activity is accompa-
nied by higher levels of domestic activ-
ity, and the ownership of active business 
assets infl uences their productivity, then 
countries benefi t from exempting foreign 
income from taxation, and global effi ciency 
requires that all nations tax foreign income 
in the same way. In this setting it follows 
that the exemption of foreign income 
should be accompanied by permitting 
full deductibility of domestic expenses, 
since doing so advances national welfare, 
and is consistent with global effi ciency if 
it is also the practice of other countries. 
A policy that instead limits domestic 
expense deductions based on indicators 
of relative foreign and domestic activity 
or income would effectively tax foreign 
income, thereby introducing ownership 
distortions. For example, if a country per-
mits only a portion of domestic expenses 
to be deducted by fi rms owning foreign 
assets, the affected fi rms have incentives 
both to shed some of their foreign assets 
and to acquire other fi rms that have sig-
nifi cant domestic assets. Firms unable to 
claim full deductions for their domestic 
expenses would also become attractive 
targets for foreign takeovers structured 
so that the combined fi rm was not subject 
to the expense allocation rules. Indeed, a 
tax system inevitably infl uences business 
ownership decisions whenever the tax 
treatment of domestic expenses is contin-
gent on the ownership of foreign assets or 
the receipt of foreign income.
Firms with foreign income that is 
exempt from home–country taxation 
have incentives to allocate capital, man-
agement attention, and other resources 
between foreign and domestic produc-
tion so that the after–foreign–tax mar-
ginal productivity of resources devoted 
to foreign production just equals the 
after–home–tax marginal productivity of 
the same resources devoted to domestic 
production. This marginal productivity 
condition is effi cient because it refl ects 
the tradeoffs made by most of the world’s 
investors and is, therefore, capitalized into 
market prices. It follows that effi ciency 
also requires that fi rms choosing among 
domestic expenses that contribute to 
domestic and foreign profi tability simi-
larly equate after–foreign–tax marginal 
foreign profi tability with after–home–tax 
domestic profitability, since otherwise 
productivity could be augmented by 
altering the mix of capital and current 
expenditures. This marginal productivity 
condition for expenses is satisfi ed only if 
domestic expenses are fully deductible 
and, therefore, not contingent on the loca-
tions in which the corresponding income 
is earned.
ANALYSIS OF DOMESTIC EXPENSE 
DEDUCTIONS
This section offers an analytic evalua-
tion of the domestic expense deduction 
rule that promotes effi ciency as captured 
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by each of the norms described in the 
third section. It is most straightforward 
fi rst to consider the case in which a home 
government treats foreign taxes simply 
as costs of doing business and, therefore, 
permits only a deduction for foreign 
income tax payments, unmindful of the 
ownership distortions associated with 
such a policy. An individual fi rm spends 
R at home to produce both domestic and 
foreign income, the value of its domestic 
production (net of other expenses) being 
denoted Q(R), and the value of its pro-
duction through a wholly owned foreign 
affi liate being denoted Q*(R). In order to 
abstract from issues of discounting and 
the taxation of capital returns, it is helpful 
to think of R as a current expense, such 
as administrative cost, that contributes 
to income production this year only. The 
home country taxes business income 
at rate τ, and the foreign country taxes 
income at rate τ∗. The home country per-
mits the fi rm to deduct a fraction α of its 
expenditures on R against home country 
taxable income, and the foreign country 
permits the fi rm to deduct a fraction γ 
of its expenditures on R against taxable 
income in the foreign country. Critically, 
γ is assumed to be unaffected by α (and 
in practice is typically zero).
The fi rm’s after–tax profi t is denoted π, 
which with this regime of taxing foreign 
income takes the value:
[1] π τ τ γ= ( ) + ( ) −( ) +⎡⎣ ⎤⎦Q R Q R R* * *1
    1−( ) − +τ ταR R.
A profi t–maximizing fi rm chooses R to 
maximize the value of π in equation [1], 
for which the fi rst order condition is:
[2] ′( ) + ′ ( ) −( ) +⎡⎣ ⎤⎦Q R Q R* * *1 τ τ γ
    1 1−( ) = −τ τα.
Taking foreign taxes to be costs, the home 
country’s return is Q(R) + Q*(R)(1 – τ*) + 
τ*γR – R, the difference between domestic 
profi ts plus after–tax foreign profi ts and 
the cost of domestic inputs. The fi rst–order 
condition for maximizing the home 
country’s return is then:
[3] ′( ) + ′ ( ) −( ) + =Q R Q R* * * .1 1τ τ γ  
Together, equations [2] and [3] imply 
that α = 1. Hence, the home country 
maximizes its total return by permitting 
taxpayers to deduct all of their domestic 
expenses, even though some of these 
expenses may contribute to productivity 
in the foreign country, and even though 
(although this is rarely the case) some of 
the expenses might be deductible in the 
foreign country.
This implication is consistent with the 
intuition that a home country that taxes 
foreign income should also permit full 
deductibility of domestic expenses associ-
ated with producing that income. Partial 
deductibility excessively discourages 
expenditures that create net value for the 
home country, so aligning taxpayer and 
national incentives therefore requires 
full deductibility. It is noteworthy that 
γ does not infl uence the implication that 
the home country maximizes value by 
permitting full deductibility, since a posi-
tive value of γ not only increases a fi rm’s 
incentive to spend on R, but also increases 
the home country’s return, which includes 
any foreign tax savings.7
It is very uncommon for countries to 
tax active foreign business income while 
providing only deductions for foreign 
income tax payments; instead, countries 
that tax foreign income typically provide 
foreign tax credits. The paradigmatic 
case of worldwide taxation with foreign 
tax credits is a system in which the home 
7 Recall that γ is assumed to be fi xed; if international cost sharing agreements or other arrangements were to 
make the level of γ contingent on α, then it would no longer necessarily follow that full domestic deductibility 
maximizes home country returns.
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country taxes foreign income without 
deferral and with unlimited provision of 
foreign tax credits (including the possibil-
ity of a rebate if foreign tax rates exceed 
the home country rate). From the stand-
point of home country fi rms facing such a 
regime of taxing their foreign investments, 
the foreign tax system becomes irrelevant, 
since any reduction in foreign taxes is 
immediately offset by greater home 
country taxes. The fi rm’s after–tax profi t, 
therefore, can be represented as:
[4] π τ τα= ( ) + ( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ −( ) − +Q R Q R R R* .1
The fi rst order condition corresponding to 
the profi t–maximizing choice of R is:
[5] ′( ) + ′ ( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ −( ) = −Q R Q R* .1 1τ τα
The standard rationale behind having a 
system of worldwide taxation and unlim-
ited foreign tax credits is to maximize 
world welfare by promoting capital export 
neutrality, as discussed in the third sec-
tion. In this framework, world economic 
welfare is given by the difference between 
world output and the cost of world inputs, 
without regard to tax considerations. 
Maximizing world welfare in this context 
therefore corresponds to maximizing 
Q(R) + Q*(R) – R, for which the fi rst order 
condition is:
[6] ′( ) + ′ ( ) =Q R Q R* .1
It is clear from inspection of equations 
[5] and [6] that once more the welfare 
maximizing policy is α = 1, full domestic 
deductibility of domestic expenses, and 
again this is unaffected by whether or 
not the foreign country permits partial 
deductibility with a positive value of γ.
The implication that domestic expenses 
should be fully deductible against domes-
tic income may not conform exactly to the 
common intuition that expenses incurred 
to produce foreign income should be 
deductible against home country taxable 
income to the extent that foreign income 
is taxed by the home country. Certainly 
in the case of worldwide taxation with 
foreign tax credits, the home country 
taxes foreign income, but the tax rate is 
zero if the average foreign tax rate equals 
the home country tax rate, and the home 
country tax rate on foreign income is 
negative if the foreign tax rate exceeds the 
domestic tax rate. In all of these cases, the 
analysis of equations [5] and [6] implies 
that effi ciency requires the home gov-
ernment to permit full deductibility of 
domestic expenses. The reason is that the 
policy of worldwide taxation is premised 
on the notion that a country benefi ts by 
enacting domestic tax rules that maximize 
the world allocation of resources. Since 
both domestic and foreign returns are 
effectively taxed at the domestic tax rate, 
effi cient incentives to devote resources 
to R require that the expense be fully 
deductible at the domestic tax rate also. 
By taxing foreign income and providing 
foreign tax credits the home country tax 
system removes any incentives created by 
foreign deductibility of expenses incurred 
in the home country, so it is necessary to 
provide full domestic deductibility to get 
the incentives right.8
Perhaps the most telling case is that 
in which the home country maximizes 
national welfare by promoting effi cient 
asset ownership through exempting for-
eign income from taxation. With foreign 
income exempt from home country taxes, 
the fi rm’s after tax profi ts are:
8 It is worth noting that, in the unlikely event that the foreign government permits deductibility of a portion of 
home country expenditures on R through a positive value of γ, the home government immediately recoups 
the value of the deductibility by granting the home country taxpayer fewer foreign tax credits. Hence, from 
a government budgetary perspective, the cost of full deductibility of home–country expenses is offset to 
whatever extent foreign governments permit partial deductions for these expenses.
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[7] π τ τ= ( ) −( ) + ( ) −( )Q R Q R1 1* *
    + + −τα τ γR R R* .
A profi t maximizing fi rm chooses R to 
satisfy:
[8] ′( ) −( ) + ′ ( ) −( )Q R Q R1 1τ τ* *
    + = −τ γ τα* .1
It is important to identify the govern-
ment’s objective in this situation. Exempt-
ing foreign income from taxation makes 
sense from the standpoint of encourag-
ing effi cient asset ownership, given the 
importance of ownership to productivity. 
Exempting foreign income from taxa-
tion implies that the government values 
equally one dollar of after–tax domestic 
income earned by home–country fi rms 
and one dollar of after–foreign–tax foreign 
income, since home–country fi rms make 
this tradeoff at the margin. This relative 
valuation is sensible in a world of shifting 
ownership, since it is effectively imposed 
by the world capital market. Then the 












The term (1 – τ) appears in the denomina-
tor of the second term of [9] to refl ect the 
fact that after–home–tax domestic income 
and after–foreign–tax foreign income are 
valued equally. Then maximizing the 
value of [9] implies:
[10] ′( ) −( ) + ′ ( ) −( )Q R Q R1 1τ τ* *
    + = −τ γ τ* ,1
from which, together with equation [8], it 
is clear that yet again the welfare maximiz-
ing policy is α = 1, or full domestic deduct-
ibility of home country expenses.
The conclusion that the home country 
maximizes welfare by permitting taxpayers 
to deduct all of their domestic expenses fol-
lows from the relative valuation of foreign 
and domestic pretax incomes. This relative 
valuation is driven by the world market, 
which values after–tax income equally in 
every country, and which allocates capital 
and other resources in a manner consistent 
with this valuation. Individual countries 
benefi t from adopting policies that are con-
sistent with world valuations of after–tax 
income, which is why it is attractive to 
exempt foreign income from taxation 
and also why it is attractive to permit full 
deductibility of domestic expenses.
CONCLUSION
Why should a country that exempts 
foreign income from taxation neverthe-
less permit full domestic deductions for 
expenditures that contribute to foreign 
profi tability? The rationale for domestic 
expense deductibility is the same as the 
rationale for exempting foreign income 
from taxation: that tax systems with these 
features foster productivity associated 
with effi cient ownership. The intuitive 
criticism that it is wrong to permit a 
deduction for an expense that generates 
untaxed income overlooks the impor-
tant role of foreign investors and begs 
the question of why the home country 
exempts foreign income from taxation in 
the fi rst place. The plain fact is that most 
countries in the world both exempt active 
foreign business income from taxation 
and permit full domestic deductibility 
of home–country expenses; and there 
are sound economic reasons why these 
policies go together and make sense in a 
world of shifting ownership.
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